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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
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**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM**

**SUBJECT: The Franco-German Treaty**

**Motivations in Paris and Bonn:**

1. Adenauer and De Gaulle share the fear that Germany after Adenauer may be afflicted with a succession of weak and unstable governments unable to prevent, and which might even foster, a drifting shift in the orientation of the Federal Republic away from the West. They view the 22 January treaty as a means of establishing firm ties between Germany and France that will help preclude such a drift. De Gaulle, moreover, desires to use the Franco-German tie as the basis for a French-led European coalition. The Chancellor clearly does not intend to pass direction of joint German-French affairs over to De Gaulle, but at the same time he does not feel it necessary to be on guard against French leadership. He undoubtedly intends to cooperate as much as possible, as the treaty provides, but he can be expected to hold fast to German positions at variance with those in Paris--as on the MLF--that engage major German interests.

2. From Adenauer's point of view, the Franco-German treaty is the high-water mark of his ten-year efforts to build a united Europe. Such a treaty, indeed, must have seemed the one step that could be taken in the time remaining to him, in view of the failure of earlier European efforts to reach agreement on closer political association. In Adenauer's view, moreover, reconciliation and friendship between France and Germany are the key not only to Europe's security and influence, but also to any further progress toward a closer European community.

3. The exchange of state visits of Adenauer and De Gaulle in the summer of 1962 provided the backdrop for the working out of a treaty on consultation and cooperation. By December, agreement had been reached and it was announced that the chiefs would meet the next month in Paris.

4. There is no reason to believe that there was a joint German-French plan to formalize the agreement coincident with the collapse of the British-EEC negotiations. On the other hand, De Gaulle did nothing to dispel the suggestion that by signing the treaty the parties were implying agreement with each other's policies. On the contrary, he evidently saw in this circumstance the opportunity he needed to take the tough positions he did in his 14 January press conference. Adenauer, however, was unable to avoid embarrassment. A storm of criticism greeted his signature of the treaty, forcing him to emphasize that the pact signaled merely reconciliation of the two countries, and not Bonn's support of French policies. The German delegation gave proof of this contention the next week by arguing for Britain's admission to the EEC in the ill-fated Brussels meeting.

The Treaty:

5. The treaty provides mainly for consultations at frequent intervals between top German and French officials. For example, the heads of state and government will meet at least twice a year, the foreign and defense ministers every three months, and lesser officials more frequently. The governments agree that on all important foreign policy questions they will consult each other and try to reach analogous positions. With respect to military strategy and tactics, they will strive for common conceptions and try to organize common armaments work. (Nuclear weapons cooperation is not excluded though both sides have denied that this is contemplated.) Educationally, each country will try to increase the study of the other's language.

6. The pattern of Franco-German consultations has not changed since the treaty was signed last January. Although still to be ratified, the treaty, in many ways, simply formalizes practices which have long been the order of the day. Thus a considerable measure of political and military cooperation had already grown up between Bonn and Paris during the past several years; high-level French and German officials have for some time been meeting regularly at approximately the intervals prescribed by the treaty. Through it all, however, Bonn has kept Paris at arms length when it came to West Germany's dealings with other countries on issues in which the policies of the two countries were not fully in accord.

Outlook:

7. Whether the consultations, after ratification, will bear more fruit in terms of policy alignment than in the past will depend on broad political considerations in both capitals. In Germany, as in France, there is strong endorsement of reconciliation between the two countries, but the Germans were very upset by the timing of the treaty and its implications for Germany's ties to the US, NATO, and the European Community. In all three political parties, there were insistent demands that these ties be strongly reaffirmed in some way in the process of ratifying the treaty. Within the coalition, the issue seems to have been resolved on 4 April by the decision to include in the preamble to the ratifying law the provision that the treaty does not affect Germany's other obligations.

8. The prospects for ratification of the treaty in Bonn by the time of De Gaulle's visit (probably the end of June) are good. Nonetheless, Adenauer will seemingly be in power only three months thereafter, and no successor will be as enthusiastic as he about bilateral policy coordination with France. There is little doubt that Vice Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, who still has the inside track to succeed to the chancellorship despite Adenauer's efforts to block him, would be cool to the development of too intimate a relationship with France. Over the years, Erhard has consistently opposed the formation of small continental groupings on grounds that they only serve as deadweight to the steady strengthening of the Atlantic community which he considers to offer much better prospects for European security and economic prosperity.

9. On the French side, De Gaulle will submit the treaty to Parliament, where there is no doubt of its approval. For De Gaulle, the treaty's ratification will be only another step toward the realization of his design for a "Europe of Fatherlands." He is thus unlikely to rest on his oars, and may attempt to develop similar arrangements with other members of the Common Market.